The Journal is reporting that the European Court of Human Rights has found that it was lawful for the Spanish State to sack a religion teacher who had publicly rejected aspects of Catholic teaching.
This is a hugely significant judgment from the European Court of Human Rights. The judgment gives some general guidance on the autonomy of Churches, including their rights to deal with dissent, and the extremely limited rights that the State has to interfere in these matters.
If you're reading, Brian D'Arcy and Tony Flannery - the ECHR says your right to dissent means you can leave the Church you no longer agree with.
Also interesting to note the respectful way the Court refers to the Church's Canon Law - clearly it doesn't think it's as meaningless as Irish politicians seem to think.
Below the extract from the Court's Press Release:
Decision of the Court
Article 8
The Court
reiterated that there was no general right to employment or to the renewal of a
fixed-term contract. However, there was no reason of principle why the notion
of “private life” should be taken to exclude professional activities. In the
present case, private life and professional life were particularly intertwined,
as factors relating to private life were regarded as qualifying criteria for
the professional activity in question. The Court thus found Article 8
applicable, as the non-renewal of the applicant’s contract, on account of
events mainly relating to personal choices he had made in the context of his
private life, had seriously affected his chances of carrying on his specific
professional activity.
The Court
noted that the Ministry of Education had acted in accordance with the 1979
Agreement between Spain and the Holy See, supplemented by the Ministerial Order
of 11 October 1982, which was an international treaty and incorporated as such
into Spanish law in conformity with the Spanish Constitution. The non-renewal of the applicant’s contract of
employment had thus been based on the applicable Spanish law.
The Court
noted that the Bishop had relied in particular on the notion of “scandal” to
justify his
decision.
Even though the notion of scandal was not expressly provided for in the part of
the Code of Canon Law
concerning religious education teachers, it could be considered to refer to
notions that were
themselves in the canons such as “true doctrine”, “witness of Christian life”
or “religious or moral
considerations”. Those provisions expressed specific requirements with
foreseeable effects.
Since Mr
Fernández Martínez had been the director of a seminary, he could have foreseen
that the public
display of his militancy against certain precepts of the Church would be at
odds with the applicable
provisions of canon law and would not be without consequence. On the basis of
the clear
wording of
the Agreement between Spain and the Holy See, he could also have reasonably
foreseen
that in the
absence of a certificate of suitability from the Church his contract would not
be renewed.
The Court
found that the non-renewal of his contract was thus in accordance with the law. Like the
parties, the Court took the view that the decision not to renew the applicant’s
contract pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of the Catholic Church,
and in particular
its autonomy as to the choice of persons qualified to teach religious doctrine.
As regards
the autonomy of faith groups, the Court noted that religious communities
traditionally and
universally existed in the form of organised structures. The right of believers
to freedom of religion
meant that they should be allowed to associate freely, without arbitrary State
intervention.
The
autonomous existence of religious communities went to the very heart of the
protection which Article 9 of
the Convention afforded. It had a direct interest, not only for the actual
organisation of
those
communities but also for the effective enjoyment by their members of the right
to freedom of
religion.
Were the organisational life of the community not protected by Article 9 of the
Convention, all other
aspects of the individual’s freedom of religion would become vulnerable.
However,
Article 9 of the Convention did not enshrine a right of dissent within a
religious community.
In the event of any disagreement between a religious community and one of its
members, the
individual’s freedom of religion was exercised by the option of freely leaving
the community.
Respect for
the autonomy of religious communities recognised by the State implied, in
particular,
that the
State should accept the right of such communities to react, in accordance with
their own
rules and
interests, to any dissident movements emerging within them that might pose a
threat to
their
cohesion, image or unity. It was therefore not the task of the national
authorities to act as the
arbiter
between religious communities and the various dissident factions that existed
or might
emerge
within them.
The Court
reiterated that, but for very exceptional cases, the right to freedom of
religion as guaranteed
under the Convention excluded any discretion on the part of the State to
determine
whether
religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs were legitimate.
Moreover, the principle of
religious autonomy prevented the State from obliging a religious community to
admit or exclude an
individual or to entrust someone with a particular religious duty.
As a
consequence of their autonomy, religious communities were entitled to demand a
certain degree of
loyalty from those working for them or representing them.
The Court,
whilst observing that Mr Fernández Martínez had not received the dispensation
from the
obligation
of celibacy until after the publication of the newspaper article, took the view
that, by
signing his
successive employment contracts, he had knowingly and voluntarily accepted a
special
duty of
loyalty towards the Catholic Church, which limited the scope of his right to
respect for his
private and
family life to a certain degree. Such contractual limitations were permissible
under the
Convention
where they were freely accepted. The Court was not convinced that at the time
of the
publication
of the article in La Verdad, this contractual duty of loyalty had ceased to
exist. In choosing to
accept a publication about his family circumstances and his association with a protest oriented
meeting, Mr Fernández Martínez had severed the bond of trust that was necessary
for the
fulfilment
of his professional duties.
The Court
observed that Mr Fernández Martínez had voluntarily been part of the circle of
individuals who were
bound by a duty of loyalty towards the Catholic Church. The fact of being seen as campaigning
in movements opposed to Catholic doctrine clearly ran counter to that duty. In addition,
there was little doubt that the applicant, as former priest and director of a
seminary, had
been or must
have been aware of the substance and significance of that duty.
Mr Fernández
Martínez had been able to complain about the non-renewal of his contract before
the
Employment
Tribunal and then before the Murcia High Court of Justice, which had examined
the
lawfulness
of the measure in question under ordinary labour law, taking ecclesiastical law
into
account, and
had weighed up the competing interests of the applicant and the Catholic
Church. At
last
instance the applicant had been able to lodge an amparo appeal with the
Constitutional Court.
Since the
reasoning for the non-renewal decision had been strictly religious, the
domestic courts had considered
that they had to confine themselves to verifying respect for the fundamental
rights at stake. Thus,
the Constitutional Court had taken the view that the State’s duty of neutrality
precluded it from
ruling on the notion of “scandal” used by the Bishop to refuse to renew the
contract, or on the merits
of the optional celibacy of priests as advocated by the applicant. It had
examined the extent of
the interference with the applicant’s rights and had found that it was neither disproportionate
nor unconstitutional, but that it could be justified in terms of respect for
the lawful exercise by
the Catholic Church of its religious freedom in its collective or community
dimension.
The Court
was of the view that the domestic courts had taken into account all the
relevant factors
and had
weighed up the interests at stake in detail and in depth, within the limits
imposed on them
by the
necessary respect for the autonomy of the Catholic Church. In the light of the
review
exercised by
the national courts, it did not appear that the autonomy of the Church had been
improperly
invoked: the Bishop’s decision could not be said to have contained insufficient
reasoning, to have been
arbitrary, or to have been taken for a purpose that was unrelated to the
exercise of the Catholic
Church’s autonomy.
Having
regard to the margin of appreciation afforded to the State, the Court found
that the interference
with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life had not been
disproportionate.
The Court
concluded by nine votes to eight that there had been no violation of Article 8.
Having
regard to its conclusion under Article 8, the Court found that there was no
need to examine
the other
complaints separately.
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